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COMMENTS
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE OFFICE OF
EDUCATION GUIDELINES
INTRODUCTION
Fourteen years after the Supreme Court's 1954 ruling in the school
segregation cases, school segregation is still with us, North and South.
Those optimistic and hopeful individuals who saw a rapid end to segrega-
tion in the Court's ruling, in the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, in
the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and in other concerted activity designed to
end segregation have been disappointed.
In an apparent effort to improve both the quantity and quality of
desegregation plans in the public schools, the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare has promulgated a set of guidelines to aid in the
desegregation of school districts.
THE BROWN DECISIONS
In 1954 the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown
1),' held that racial segregation of children in public schools, even if the
schools provided equal physical facilities deprived children of the right
to an equal education.' While holding that "[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal" 3 the Court delayed the implementation
of this constitutional right until it could effectuate the holding in
Brown 1.4 Approximately one year later, in the second Brown v. Board
of Educ. (Brown 11) 5 decision, the Court called for gradual relief
whereby a federal district court was to administer desegregation in each
case, in a manner "necessary and proper to admit to public schools on
a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to
these cases." ' Apparently the Court sought to accommodate varying
local situations by adopting this case-by-case procedure rather than a
single uniform plan of desegregation.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Id. at 493. The effect of the holding in Brown I was to abandon the "separate but
equal" doctrine established in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Segregation under
the "separate but equal" doctrine was sustained by supposedly providing equal facilities for
the educational system of the two races. There is some doubt whether the requirement of
equal facilities for both races stated in Plessy v. Ferguson was effectively enforced prior
to the decision in Brown.
3. 347 U.S. at 495 (1954).
4. For instances where the Supreme Court has delayed the implementation of con-
stitutional rights see Note, School Desegregation and the Office of Education Guidelines, 55
GEo. L.J. 325, 326 n.1O (1967).
5. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
6. Id. at 301.
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Forms of resistance legislation were enacted with the effect of thwart-
ing, or at least delaying, efforts to implement the ruling in the School
Segregation Cases.7 Moreover, various court decisions failed to provide
any affirmative duty to integrate the public schools.' In short, the case-
by-case procedure and the desegregation plans adopted by various school
districts resulted in significant desegregation in only a very small per-
centage of the schools.'
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Amidst national concern over the dilemma of the Negro in the United
States, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 Two titles of the
act have emerged as the most controversial encroachments upon school
desegregation. 1 Title IV of the act 2 defines desegregation as "the as-
signment of students to public schools and within such schools without
regard to their race, color, religion or national origin. ... 'I" Title VI 4
7. See generally Note, Pupil Placement Laws, 16 W. REs L. REv. 800 (1965). A list
of other resistance statutes is given in 2 U.S. Comm'N ONCiVIL RIGHTS Rr. 65 (1961) at
205-208.
8. See Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955) wherein the court stated at
777 that the constitution does not require integration but rather merely forbids discrimina-
tion. The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment was relied upon to indicate that
the Amendment was not intended to affect the problem of segregation in public schools.
See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HAIv. L. REv. 1
(1955). See also Rippy v. Borders, 250 F.2d 690 (5 Cir. 1957) and Avery v. Wichita Falls
Independent School District, 241 F.2d 230 (5 Cir. 1957).
9. The case-by-case method was time consuming and expensive, often resulting in a
large backlog of court cases involving desegregation. Although the courts have often held
that desegregation is the responsibility of school boards and school officials, the freedom
of choice method of desegregation adopted by many school districts relies upon the initia-
tive of minority groups to actively seek admittance to segregated schools, thus effectively
shifting the burden to such groups. As to the responsibility of school boards and school
officials, see Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955); Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate
School Dist., 348 F.2d 729, 730 (5 Cir. 1965); Wright v. County School Board of Greens-
ville County, Va., 252 F. Supp. 378, 383 (E.D. Va. 1966); Henderson v. Iberia Parish
School Board, 245 F. Supp. 419, 421 (W.D. La. 1965).
For the percentages of Negro students going to school with white students in individual
states see, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1966 at 123. See also United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372
F.2d 836, 903-905 (5th Cir. 1967) (Appendix B).
10. 78 Stat. 252 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
11. For a detailed discussion of Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 see
Note, School Desegregation and the Office of Education Guidelines, 55 GEO. L.J. 325 (1967);
Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 VA. L. PEv.
42 (1967).
12. 78 Stat. 246, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9.
13. 78 Stat. 246, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b). Title IV adds, however, that " 'desegregation'
shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial
imbalance." Id.
14. 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4.
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provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."' 5
Therefore, to implement the provisions of Title VI, every federal
department or agency dispensing federal aid to any program or activity
is authorized to develop and issue, after presidential approval, rules and
regulations consonant with objectives of the statute under which the
assistance is granted.' 6 Pursuant to this directive, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare in 1965 established minimum desegrega-
tion standards for schools seeking federal aid."
THE GUIDELINES
Most southern school districts in the process of desegregation operate
under "freedom of choice plans." The 1965 Guidelines incorporated
freedom of choice as one acceptable type of desegregation plan, and,
therefore, these Guidelines were generally acceptable throughout the
South. However, in March 1966 the Office of Education issued a new
set of Guidelines which included a test of effectiveness for the freedom
of choice plans. 8 The 1966 Guidelines resulted in significant opposition
within the South to the new standards.
Each segregated school district was required to submit either a final
court order requiring desegregation or a voluntary plan for desegrega-
tion acceptable to the Commissioner of HEW. 9 The voluntary plans
submitted had to conform to standards established for the desegregation
of a school system.20 Moreover, under the Guidelines, a school district
could qualify for federal aid by submitting a court approved plan re-
quiring the school district to desegregate.2 '
In order to insure compliance with the Guidelines, the Office of Educa-
tion may refuse to grant federal aid to a non-complying school district.
Initially the Office of Education must make positive efforts to secure
voluntary compliance before any other action can be taken. 2 In the
15. 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
16. 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
17. 30 Fed. Reg. 9981 (1965) (hereinafter cited as 1965 Guidelines).
18. 31 Fed. Reg. 5623 (1966) (hereinafter cited as 1966 Guidelines). See Dunn, Title
VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 VA. L. REv. 42 (1967). The
author states at 44 that the 1966 Guidelines required that the efforts of school districts to
desegregate must result in actual desegregation, thus reopening the issue of whether there
is an affirmative duty to desegregate the schools.
19. See 1965 Guidelines § 180.2.
20. Id. § 180.5.
21. 1965 Guidelines § 180.2. 1966 Guidelines § 181.2.
22. 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
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event efforts to secure voluntary compliance fail, the Commissioner must
follow certain procedures including notification of the right to a hearing
before administrative proceedings are completed and funds terminated.
2 3
One purpose of the Guidelines was to overcome the reluctance of
school districts to formulate desegregation plans that work. In September,
1967 the voters of Little Rock, Arkansas turned down a University of
Oregon Bureau of Education Research study that proponents said, "could
in just two years achieve an integrated high quality educational program
for all children."24 Moreover, a Little Rock School Board member who
openly supported the plan was voted out of office during the same
election. 5 The unwillingness of school districts to adopt effective de-
segregation plans that would serve to speed up desegregation has served
merely to prolong antagonism between the federal government and re-
calcitrant school districts. It is within this atmosphere that the Guidelines
must act to prevent further delay of desegregation.
Thus, Title VI provided the procedure whereby an administrative
agency may terminate federal aid to any program or activity whose
purpose is inimical to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
order to implement the provisions of Title VI, HEW issued the Guide-
lines for the purpose of establishing standards for the effective desegrega-
tion of school districts seeking federal aid. However, the Guidelines
provided that if a school district submitted a final court order requiring
desegregation, the submission of a voluntary plan for desegregation
conforming to the Guidelines was not required. Nothing on the face of
Title VI itself required the government to make an exception for school
,districts under a final court order even though a court approved plan
might be inconsistent with, and less demanding than, the HEW Guide-
lines.
THE GUIDELINES AND THE COURT
Therefore, the courts were faced with the possible dichotomy between
agency standards concerning school desegregation and judicial standards
imposed to give content to the equal protection provision. The court in
Singleton v. Jackson Municipal School Dist.,2' recognized the diffi-
culty that would ensue should court standards differ from the Office of
Education Guidelines. Apparently respecting agency familiarity with
23. 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
24. See article by John Egerton, SATURDAY REvIEw, December 16, 1967 at 60, Little
Rock Ten Years Later. The author stated: "the voters of the Arkansas capital city had a
chance to exchange the segregation albatross for a bird of another feather, but by a margin of
more than seven to five, they kept the albatross."
25. Id. at 61.
26. 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965) wherein the court stated at 731, "We attach great
weight to the standards established by the Office of Education."
27. Id. at 732.
(Vol. 6:373
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desegregation problems, Judge Wisdom directed the parties and the
district court to the Guidelines in order to conform the free choice plans
to the agency standards."8 In Davis v. Board of School Commissioners29
and Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District (Singleton
11)8 ° the court stated that the Guidelines were only minimum standards.
The court in Singleton IH said:
HEW's Statement of April 1965 establishes only minimum
standards of general application. In certain school districts and
in certain respects, HEW standards may be too low to meet the
requirements established by the Supreme Court and by this
Court; we doubt that they would ever be too high. (Emphasis
in original.)"'
Again turning to the problem of disparity between agency and judi-
cial standards, Judge Wisdom in United States v. Jefferson County
Board of Education"2 expanded the concept used in Singleton II:
We summarize the Court's policy as one of encouraging the
maximum legally permissible correlation between judicial stan-
dards for school desegregation and HEW Guidelines. This
policy may be applied without federal courts' abdicating their
judicial function. The policy complies with the Supreme Court's
increasing emphasis on more speed and less deliberation in
school desegregation."3
Thus Jefferson brought about a more apparent correlation between judi-
cial and agency standards by adopting the HEW Guidelines in full. The
court held that the HEW Guidelines comprised the minimum con-
stitutional requirements, were within the scope of the Civil Rights Act,
and correspond to the standards it had developed.3 4
The establishing of HEW Guidelines as minimum constitutional re-
quirements makes a school district subject to government requirements
in a way Title VI never contemplated. The government requirements
in the form of the Guidelines must be complied with whether or not a
school district chooses to receive federal aid. Moreover, the agency re-
quirements must be complied with whether the court has reviewed them
or not. The minimum standards reflected in the Office of Education
28. Id. at 731. See also Price v. Denison Independent School Dist. Board of Education,
348 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1965).
29. 364 F.2d 896, 902-903 (5th Cir. 1966).
30. 355 F.2d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 1966).
31. Id.
32. 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1967); 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 36
U.S.L.W. 3138 (Oct. 9, 1967).
33. Id. at 861.
34. Id. at 848, 859.
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Guidelines will necessarily fluctuate with each issuance. The most logical
proposal is that the minimum standards imposed by the Office of Educa-
tion will become more stringent with each new set of Guidelines. 5 Adop-
tion of future Guidelines without review must be predicated on the
assumption that agency standards may incorporate only constitutional
requirements. However, agency interpretation of constitutional require-
ments may be at variance with judicial pronouncements of constitutional
standards necessary to effectuate compliance with the equal protection
provision.
Prior to the adoption of the Guidelines, school desegregation had
proceeded under the holdings in the Brown cases. Brown gave individuals
access to the courts in order to gain the constitutional right granted in
the decision. Specifically, Brown set forth the constitutional standards
which were applied by the courts to desegregate the public schools. How-
ever, a school district's failure to comply with HEW Guidelines as
minimum constitutional standards as opposed to some other plan not
consonant with the Guidelines, may grant individuals further judicial
standing upon which to bring about desegregation beyond the consti-
tutional standards espoused in Brown. It would appear that the burden
of instituting effective desegregation plans is placed heavily upon the
individual school districts. Unreasonable delay or the adoption of an
unacceptable desegregation plan should give rise to the intervention of
the courts in order to speed up reluctant or unwilling school districts.
Courts have long accepted prior cases upon which to formulate deci-
sions. Moreover, legislation has been judicially incorporated into the
case law.36 However, the adoption of administrative agency standards
as minimum constitutional requirements represents a novel development
in court-made law.
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTISE
Confidence or lack of confidence in particular agencies affect the
judicial response to agency pronouncements. One justification given in
Jefferson for the adoption of the Guidelines is the belief in the greater
expertise of the Office of Education. 7 Such reliance on the greater ex-
pertise of the Office of Education is questionable. Surely the 5th Circuit
35. To some extent this has occurred with the issuance of the 1966 Guidelines. The
1965 Guidelines would apparently accept a freedom of choice plan as evidence of an attempt
to desegregate the school system. However, the 1966 Guidelines called for an evaluation of
such plans as to whether or not significant desegregation would result from their adoption.
See text accompanying n.18 supra.
36. See Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. Rav. 383 (1908).
37. Judge Wisdom states that "most judges do not have sufficient competence-they
are not educators or school administrators-to know the right questions, much less the




is the most experienced in the field of desegregation. They have lived
with the problem of proper desegregation plans and their content for
fourteen years. A thorough reading of the opinion in Jeflerson discloses
a comprehensive understanding of the problem by Judge Wisdom. The
lack of understanding and competence to fashion a suitable desegrega-
tion decree attributed to most judges (presumably directed at the
District Courts) does not logically follow fourteen years of experience in
this area. Perhaps, a better understanding of the problems would ensue
if certain sociological traditions were finally put to rest.
Many of the problems associated with desegregation are political in
nature and it can be argued that the legislative process is more adept at
coping with problems arousing emotional and political instincts. However,
it is unlikely that any legislation approximating the Office of Education
Guidelines in content would emanate from Congress. Thus the task of
promulgating standards with which to speed up desegregation under
the Civil Rights Act has apparently fallen on the judicial and executive
branches of government. As Justice Hugo Black of the Supreme Court
recently stated:
There is a tendency now among some to look to the judiciary
to make all major policy decisions of our society under the
guise of determining constitutionality. The belief is that the
Supreme Court will reach a faster and more desirable resolution
of our problems than the legislative or executive branches of
the Government. I would much prefer to put my faith in the
people and their elected representatives to choose the proper
policies, leaving to the courts questions of constitutional inter-
pretation and enforcement. 8
However, in the area of desegregation, faith in the people and their
elected representatives to choose the proper policies under present socio-
logical traditions would produce questionable results.
THE GUIDELINES AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
Each administrative agency has numerous powers derived from
various statutory provisions, and each is subject to the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 9 Within their specified fields of jurisdic-
tion administrative agencies promulgate general rules and regulations,
formulate the specific content of general policy, select and license
particular enterprises and perform various other functions. Whatever
jurisdiction, power, or authority an administrative agency might possess,
38. Quoted in TimE March 29, 1968 at 76.
39. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001.
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therefore, is derived from enabling statutes providing for the general
governing principles.4"
An agency has power to adopt certain regulations by virtue of a
general rulemaking power, using the rulemaking procedure of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.41 Rules may be formulated through several
means: no participation by the parties affected, consultations and con-
ferences between the agency and the parties, consultation with advisory
committees representing parties, written briefs or presentation of written
data, speechmaking hearings, and trial type hearings."
Moreover, one proposed advantage of the rulemaking procedure over
less formal and comprehensive methods of administrative procedure is
uniformity of application. The Federal Trade Commission has emphasized
that when a practice is widespread in an industry, a rulemaking pro-
ceeding operates evenhandedly to bar that practice on the part of all,
while an order directed to only one permits his competitors to gain an
unfair advantage.43 Much of the disparity problem created by the HEW
Guidelines was precipitated by the exception for school districts under
a final court order. It was feared that the school districts might resort to
the courts in the hope of being subjected to less stringent standards in
a court desegregation decree. Therefore, perhaps the only prudent course
was to adopt the HEW Guidelines (although there is doubt that the
Guidelines are "rules") as minimum constitutional standards in order to
insure uniform desegregation decrees and to prevent an unfair advantage
to those school districts who would seek less stringent decrees from
the courts. In addition, the declaration of policy by means of regulations
or rules may make more available the process of judicial review.44 At
the same time, however, the threat of review may operate to discourage
an agency from taking any steps that would expose a questionable stand
to judicial scrutiny.45
40. For a compilation of statutes governing such agencies as the Federal Trade Com-
mission, National Labor Relations Board, Federal Communications Commission, and others,
see Loevinger, The Administrative Agency as a Paradigm of Government-A Survey of the
Administrative Process, 40 IND. L.J. 287 (1965).
41. Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter cited as APA) contains
the rulemaking provisions. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003.
42. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 6.01, at 101 (1959). See generally,
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HARv. L. REv. 921 (1965).
43. See, e.g., El Paso Elec. Co., 8 S.E.C. 366, 377 (1940); Virginia Pub. Serv. Co.,
6 S.E.C. 419, 428 (1939).
44. For a discussion of judicial review of agency regulations see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TEXT, § 21,01, at 372 (1959).
45. See generally Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw.
U.L. REV. 781 (1965). See also Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the
Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965) where the author states
at 943, "Nevertheless, there remain a number of areas where virtually no efforts have been
[Vol. 6:373
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Therefore, the clearest basis for agency authority to issue legally
binding regulations is a statute which specifically confers the power or
the duty to issue them with respect to a defined subject, and prescribes
the effect which they, or violations of them, shall have. Notice of the
regulations themselves may be conveyed to all concerned through publica-
tion in the Federal Register as well as other channels."6 Title VI autho-
rizes agencies dispensing federal funds to issue rules, regulations, or
orders to implement the provisions of the statute.47 In response to this
directive the HEW Guidelines were issued.
The Administrative Procedure Act while seeking to define "rule" and
"rule-making,"4" and "order" and "adjudication ' 49 does not give much
information on the status of the Guidelines and their relationship to
procedural requirements. Thus apparently revisions of the Guidelines
need not follow formal procedures of rule-making since the Guidelines
do not appear to be rules, regulations, or orders as those terms are
defined in the APA.6 0 As noted by the dissent in Jefferson:
When confronted with the fact that the guidelines were not
approved by the President as required by the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the opinion then concluded that they do not constitute
or purport to be rules or regulations or orders of general applica-
made to issue regulations elaborating the statutory standards, although the agency has
accumulated years of experience in the application of those standards in adjudicatory pro-
ceedings."
46. Section 3 of the APA requires the publication in the Federal Register of both
"substantive rules" and interpretations formulated and adopted for the guidance of the
public. A cumulative, government-wide compilation is contained in the Code of Federal
Regulations, authorized by statute, 49 Stat. 503 (1935), as amended, 44 U.S.C. § 311
(1958).
47. Section 602 provides in part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or con-
tract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to
effectuate the provisions of section 601 with respect to such program or activity
by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be
consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the
financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.
78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
48. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c).
49. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(d).
50. The section on rule-making in the APA, § 1003, apparently excludes from the
procedural requirements of the Act rules "relating to . . . loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts" and general statements of policy." Since the phrase "general statements of
policy" is not defined in the Act, there is no real way to decide whether the Guidelines fall
within its meaning, although the official title of the Guidelines-Revised Statement of
Policies for Desegregation Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964-suggests that they do. In
any case, the Guidelines do appear to fall within the first exception, since they "relate to"
terminations, continuance, grant and denial of federal financial assistance including loans
and grants.
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tion. It was then stated that since they were not a rule, regula-
tion or order, they constitute a statement of policy, and while
HEW is under no statutory compulsion to issue such statements
it was decided that it is "of manifest advantage" to the general
public to know the basic considerations which the Commissioner
uses in determining whether a school meets the requirements
for eligibility to receive financial assistance."
CONCLUSION
Thus it appears that procedurally the HEW Guidelines fall somewhere
within the realm of the unknown. The administrative problems that they
create are many and varied. Had the HEW promulgated "rules, regula-
tions, or orders" as authorized by Title VI and not procedurally vague
policy statements the problems may not have been so apparent. Perhaps
policy statements which are eventually destined to become minimum
constitutional standards in the area of desegregation should follow a
more formal course. This is not to deny the significant contribution
Title VI has obviously made to school desegregation. However, in an
effort to increase the rate of desegregation we must be careful neither
to fracture existing constitutional rights nor to abuse the administrative
process. The inherent dangers are self-evident in such a course.
Moreover, a coalition between the judiciary and the executive is
certainly desirable in the area of desegregation. However, the courts
should not seek to abdicate from the field in deference to executive
action. In the area of constitutional rights the impetus should be sup-
plied by the courts when the legislature is reluctant to act.
Dan Cooper
51. 380 F.2d 385, 401 (5th Cir. 1967).
